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1 Introduction
The mechanism design literature of the last thirty years has been a big success on a number of
different levels. A beautiful theoretical literature has shown how a wide range of institutional design
questions can be formally posed as mechanism design problems with a common structure. We can
understand institutions as solutions to a well defined maximization problems subject to incentive
constraints. Elegant characterizations of optimal mechanisms have been obtained. Market design
has become more important in many economic arenas, both because of new insights from theory
and developments in information technology. A very successful econometric literature has tested
auction theory in practise.
The basic issue in mechanism design is how to truthfully elicit private and decentralized infor-
mation in order to achieve some private or social objective. The task of the principal is then to
design a game of incomplete information in which the agents have indeed an incentive to reveal the
information. The optimal design depends on the common prior which the principal and the agents
share about the types of the agents. Unfortunately, the general theory, the applications and the
empirical work have rather different natural starting points. The theoretical analysis begins with
a given common prior, often over a small set of types, and then analyzes the optimal mechanism
with respect to this prior. Yet, the fine details of the specified environment incorporated in the
common prior are rarely available to the designer in practise.
In this survey, we shall pursue two distinct but closely related arguments. The first part of
this survey is centered on the issue of endogenous information structures in mechanism design.
In traditional mechanism design literature, the set of possible types for the participants in the
design problem is exogenously given. This may be a reasonable approximation in situations such as
determining Pareto efficient allocations in an exchange economy where individual preferences are
private information. It is equally clear that for many applications it is not reasonable to assume
that the relevant information is independent of the mechanism chosen.
To illustrate the point concretely, consider decision making in committees. If committee mem-
bers have to invest privately in order to have useful information, then it is clear that their willingness
to invest in such information depends on the choice of the decision making process. If additional
information has little impact on the eventual decision, there is no point to acquiring it. As a second,
slightly different application where the participants’ information depends on the mechanism chosen,
consider the optimal design of auctions. The auctioneer may have control over pieces of evidence
that determine the bidders’ valuation for the object on sale. Whether it is in the auctioneer’s best
interest to disclose this information depends on the properties of the auction to follow.
We view information acquisition and information disclosure as two different aspects of an infor-
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mation management problem that we believe is important in many mechanism design settings. In
our view, in many examples of great practical interest, it is not accurate to view the distribution of
types as independent from the choice of the mechanism. At the most abstract level, we may think
about mechanisms as institutions that coordinate societies on particular collective choices. As long
as the relevant information is produced within the economies, it should be clear that this produc-
tion is guided by economic incentives. Hence a good mechanism ought to provide incentives for
efficient collective choices given the information collected, but at the same time a good mechanism
should also provide the participants with good incentives for producing the relevant information.
We review the existing literature on information acquisition and disclosure in a number of
applications. It is our intention to show that by adding an information acquisition stage a number
of features arise across the spectrum of applications. Two aspects deserve mention here. With
information acquisition, the extensive form, and in particular the timing, becomes more important
than in standard mechanisms. Second, randomizations play a role in settings that can be analyzed
using pure strategies in the basic model.
In the second part of this survey, we analyze mechanism design when the principal and the
agents have little common knowledge and the type space is large. The starting point here is the
influential formulation of the robustness question due to Robert Wilson. Wilson emphasized that
academic mechanisms designers were tempted to assume too much common knowledge among
the players, and suggested that more robust conclusions would arise if researchers were able to
relax those assumptions. Practitioners have often been led to argue in favor of using simpler but
apparently sub-optimal mechanisms. It is argued that the optimal mechanisms are not ”robust”
- that is they are too sensitive to fine details of the specified environment. In response to these
concerns, attractive and influential results have been obtained by imposing (in a somewhat ad hoc
way) stronger solution concepts and simpler mechanisms motivated by robustness considerations.
A natural theoretical question to ask is whether it is possible to explicitly model robustness in
such a way that stronger solution concepts and simpler mechanisms arise endogenously. To the
extent that the agents have or can get access to private information about their own valuation,
the valuations of other agents or the beliefs of the others, the designer is led to adopt a robust
mechanism. Consequently, in this survey we shall study mechanism design when we relax both the
small and the given type space assumptions.
The remainder of this survey is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the basic model and
notation for the survey. Section 3 is meant to motivate and emphasize the perspective of this
survey. We shall first discuss the role of information acquisition in generalized Vickrey Groves
Clark mechanism and then talk about the role of strategic information in first price auctions. In
Section 4 we survey the role of information management in mechanism design. Section 5 frames
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the concern for robust mechanism by emphasizing the importance of strategic uncertainty. We
discusses recent results on robust mechanisms and show how classic auction results are modified
by the introduction of large type spaces expressing strategic uncertainty. Section 6 concludes the
survey and discusses a number of open and note worthy research issues.
2 Setup
2.1 Payoff Environment
We consider a finite set of agents, indexed by i ∈ I = {1, ..., I}. The agents have to make a
collective choice y from a set Y of possible outcomes. The payoff type of agent i is θi ∈ Θi. We
write θ ∈ Θ = Θ1 × · · · × ΘI . Each agent has utility function ui : Y × Θ → R. An important
special case is the quasi-linear environment where the set of outcomes Y has the product structure
Y = Y0 × Y1 × · · · × YI , where Y1 = Y2 = ... = YI = R, and a utility function:
ui (y, θ) = ui (y0, y1, ..., yI , θ) , vi (y0, θ) + yi,
which is linear in yi for every agent i.
The collective choice problem is represented by a social choice correspondence F : Θ → 2Y \∅,
a social choice function is given by f : Θ → Y . If the true payoff type profile is θ, the planner
would like the outcome to be an element of F (θ) , or f (θ). This environment is fixed and informally
understood to be common knowledge. We allow for interdependent types - one agent’s payoff from
a given outcome depends on other agents’ payoff types. The model is said to be a private value
model if for all θ, θ′ :
θi = θ′i ⇒ ui (y, θ) = ui
(
y, θ′
)
. (1)
If condition (1) is violated, then the model displays interdependent values.
The payoff type profile is understood to contain all information that is relevant to whether the
planner achieves her objective or not. It incorporates many classic problems such as the efficient
allocation of an object, the efficient provision of a public good, and arriving at a decision in a
committee.
Much of the recent work on interdependent values has used the solution concept of ex post rather
than Bayesian equilibrium. The analysis of ex post equilibrium is considerably more tractable,
because incentive compatible transfers can often be derived with ease and single crossing conditions
generating incentive compatibility are easy to identify.1
1Ex post incentive compatibility was discussed as ”uniform incentive compatibility” by Holmstrom and Myerson
(1983). Ex post equilibrium is increasingly studied in game theory (see Kalai (2004)) and is often used in mechanism
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Definition 1 A direct mechanism f : Θ→ Y is ex post incentive compatible if, for all i and θ ∈ Θ,
ui (f (θ) , θ) ≥ ui
(
f
(
θ′i, θ−i
)
, θ
)
, for all θ′i ∈ Θi.
The notion of ex post incentive compatibility requires agent i to prefer truthtelling at θ if all
the other agents also report truthfully. In contrast the notion of dominant strategy implementation
requires agent i to prefer truthtelling for all possible reports by the other agents, truthtelling or
not.
Definition 2 A direct mechanism f : Θ→ Y is incentive compatible in dominant strategies if, for
all i and θ ∈ Θ,
ui
(
f
(
θi, θ
′
−i
)
, θ
) ≥ ui (f (θ′) , θ) , for all θ′ ∈ Θ.
If there are private values (i.e., each ui (y, θ) depends on θ only through θi), then ex post
incentive compatibility is equivalent to dominant strategies incentive compatibility.
2.2 Information Acquisition
In problems of choice under uncertainty, the starting point of the analysis is often the situation
where an agent holds a prior probability distribution on the states of the world ω ∈ Ω and must
decide on an optimal action y ∈ Y . One way to model information acquisition is then to assume
that the agent has access to a statistical experiment that yields additional information on ω. Each
outcome in the experiment results in a posterior belief on Ω. Since the posterior belief represents
the payoff relevant information of the agent, we denote (in accordance with the previous subsection)
the set of probability distributions on Ω by Θ with a generic element θ ∈ Θ.
For the purposes of the current survey, it is easiest to formulate the information acquisition
decision of the agent as a choice amongst a set of distributions on Θ. We index the experiments
by α ∈ A and hence an experiment results in a distribution Fα (θ) on Θ. We also write the utility
function of the agent directly in terms of the posterior and the chosen action u (y, θ). Under suitable
regularity conditions, there is an optimal action y (θ) for each θ. If we denote the cost of observing
experiment α by c (α) , the information acquisition problem can be written concisely as follows:
max
α∈A
{∫
Θ
u (y (θ) , θ) dFα (θ)− c (α)
}
.
design as a more robust solution concept (Cremer and McLean (1985)). A recent literature on interdependent value
environments has obtained positive and negative results using this solution concept: Dasgupta and Maskin (2000),
Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002), Perry and Reny (2002), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001), Jehiel, Moldovanu, Meyer-
Ter-Vehn, and Zame (2005) and Bikhchandani (2005).
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To see a concrete example that fits the framework above, consider the case where ω ∈ {0, 1}.
Then we may identify Θ with [0, 1] where θ = Pr{ω = 1}. Let θ0 indicate the prior distribution of
the agent and consider the following family of experiments:
Fα (θ) =

(1− θ0)α for θ < θ0,
1− θ0α for θ0 ≤ θ < 1,
1 for θ = 1.
Here α is the probability of observing a perfectly informative signal on ω. It is easy to generate
richer examples of this structure.
When considering the mechanism design problem, all relevant information for the mechanism
is contained in the vector of posteriors (θ1, ..., θI) . It is thus possible to consider the posteriors
directly as the inputs that the mechanism designer elicits from the participants in the mechanism.
The choice of individual experiment αi determines the appropriate distribution for the posteriors
θi. Since these posteriors are in general multi-dimensional (and quite often infinite dimensional),
it is clear that unless further assumptions on the payoff structures are made, the task of designing
mechanisms in such settings is very complicated. We shall consider throughout the case where
the ex ante investment in information is covert. As a result, the mechanism cannot be written as
directly depending on αi.
3 Motivating Examples
3.1 Information Acquisition in Generalized VCG auctions
Our first example examines the role of information acquisition in a single unit auction with inter-
dependent values. More specifically, we are interested in the possibility of inducing the bidders to
gather information in a socially efficient manner.
The auction has two bidders, each of whom has statistically independent private information on
a different binary aspect ωi ∈ {ωi, ωi} = {0, 1} of the good. We denote by θi bidder i′s probability
assessment on the event {ωi = ωi}. We assume that player i′s payoff from obtaining the object at
price yi takes the following linear form:
ui (θ) = αθi + βθj − yi, (2)
where we assume that α > 0. If β = 0, we are in the private values case. When α = β, we have a
model with pure common values.
Denote the allocation of the object in the auction by y0 ∈ {1, 2}. Efficiency requires that
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y0 (θi, θj) = i if (α− β) (θi − θj) > 0.
Hence a necessary condition for incentive compatibility of the efficient allocation is that α ≥ β.
Under this condition, it is easy to verify that the direct mechanism consisting of
yi (θi, θj) =
{
(α+ β) θj if θi ≥ θj ,
0 if θi < θj ,
and
y0 (θi, θj) = i if θi ≥ θj ,
is ex post incentive compatible. This mechanism is called the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism and its analysis in the interdependent values case is due to Maskin (1992) and
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000).
With statistical independence of types, the revenue equivalence theorem implies that the ex-
pected payoffs of the two bidders in all efficient mechanisms coincide with the payoffs in the gener-
alized VCG mechanism. As we are focusing here on socially efficient information acquisition, it is
natural to ask whether an individual bidder’s incentives to acquire additional information coincide
with those of a utilitarian social planner.
Our main finding in Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002) implies that when β < 0, the generalized
VCG auction gives too low incentives for information acquisition to the individual bidders. If β > 0,
the agents have an incentive to engage in excessive information acquisition.
To see the intuition for this result, notice that the generalized VCG mechanism allocates the
object to i only if θi ≥ θj . For θi ≥ θj ,
ui (θi, θj)− ui (θj , θj) = max{ui (θi, θj) , uj (θi, θj)} − ui (θj , θj) ,
and hence the gains from higher θi are the same for bidder i and for the social planner. Bidder
i′s payoff is zero in the generalized VCG mechanism for all θi < θj . If β > 0 then the utilitarian
planner’s payoff is increasing also for θi < θj . Hence the payoff to bidder i has a sharper kink at
θj than the planner’s utility function. As a result, bidder i is locally more risk loving than the
planner and hence she has stronger incentives to acquire information. It should be noted that when
β = 0, bidder i′s payoff equals the planner’s payoff as a function of θi (up to a constant) and as
a result, private incentives for information acquisition coincide with the planner’s incentives in a
private value environment.
This example shows how efficient use of information is often incompatible with efficient acquisi-
tion of information. It is clear that a second best mechanism would sacrifice some of the allocational
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efficiency relative to the generalized VCG mechanism in order to achieve better alignment of private
and social incentives in the information acquisition stage. Full exploration of this trade-off remains
an open question at this time.
3.2 Strategic Information in First-Price Auctions
Our second example demonstrates the importance of modeling information about other players’
types. In a setting with independent private value we consider a first price auction among two
bidders for a single object. For simplicity, we consider a discrete space of values and bids. The
valuations are given for each i by:
θi ∈ Θi = {1, 2, 3} ,
and the feasible bids for each i are given by:
bi ∈ Bi = {1/2, 1, 3/2, 2, 5/2, 3} .
The valuations are distributed uniformly and independently according to a common prior p (θi, θj) :
t1j t
2
j t
3
j
t1i
1
9
1
9
1
9 θ
1
i
t2i
1
9
1
9
1
9 θ
2
i
t3i
1
9
1
9
1
9 θ
3
i
θ1j θ
2
j θ
3
j
(3)
The private information of bidder i, her type ti, consists of her true valuation, θi (payoff relevant
type), and her belief about the valuations of the other bidders, the posterior distribution, p (θj |θi ).
In the standard model of auctions, each payoff type θi is associated with exactly one belief type,
and hence the additional notation of a type ti may appear at first glance redundant.
We wish to consider a richer environment in which each bidder receives some additional private
information about her competitor. To keep matters simple, let us suppose that every bidder with
a high valuation, i.e. θi = 3, obtains some additional information. This additional information,
represented by two distinct types, t′i and t
′′
i , refines her view about the strength of her competitor
as follows:
θ1j θ
2
j θ
3
j Pr (ti |θi = 3)
p (θj |t′i ) 36 26 16 23 ← “weak” competitor
p (θj |t′′i ) 0 26 46 13 ← “strong” competitor
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The last column in the above matrix represents the likelihood that a bidder with a high valuation
receives either one of the two possible pieces of information, t′i or t
′′
i . The posterior beliefs, p (θj |ti )
over the valuations θj of bidder j differ across the two types, t′i or t
′′
i , indicating that bidder j is
a weak or strong competitor, respectively. We also observe that the aggregate distribution over
valuations θj given θi has not changed. The common prior on the new type space is now:
t1j t
2
j t
3
j t
4
j
t1i
1
9
1
9
1
9 0 θ
1
i
t2i
1
9
1
9
2
27
1
27 θ
2
i
t3i
1
9
2
27
1
27 0 θ
3
i
t4i 0
1
27 0
2
27 θ
3
i
θ1j θ
2
j θ
3
j θ
3
j
(4)
Observe that the distributions over valuations θ are identically, uniformly and independently dis-
tributed in both type spaces. Yet as we consider how the new information affects bidding in the
first price auction, we observe a few important differences. In the small type space, the unique
equilibrium bidding strategy, b∗i (ti) is given by:
b∗i (ti) =
1
2
θi (ti) ,
which is also the bidding strategy in the continuous version of the model. However, in the larger
type space, the bidding strategy changes as the bidders use their additional information to modify
their bidding strategy. The unique equilibrium bidding strategy b∗∗i (ti) is indeed given by:
b∗∗i (ti) =
1
2
θi (ti) , for ti = t1i , t
2
i
but
b∗∗i
(
t3i
)
= 1 6= 3
2
= b∗i
(
t4i
)
, for ti = t3i , t
4
i .
The introduction of strategic uncertainty and more private information for the bidders has then
a number of important implications for the equilibrium. First, even though the distribution of
valuations remains identical across the two type spaces, the larger type space leads to lower bids
and lower revenues for the auctioneer. Types t3i and t
4
i share the same payoff type, θi = 3, but
have different private information about their competitors and hence different equilibrium bids. In
a second price auction, the bidding strategy would remain identical across the type spaces, and
hence the revenues would stay constant as well. We also find that in the larger type space the first
price auction does not lead to an efficient allocation. The bids of types t2i and t
3
i are identical even
though θi
(
t2i
)
< θi
(
t3i
)
. In Section 5, we show more generally that type spaces richer than the
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standard payoff type space lead to a failure of the revenue equivalence theorem, do not permit a
revenue ranking between first and second price auction, and lead to a failure of efficiency in the
first price auction.
4 Information Management
4.1 Information Acquisition in Committees
We start our survey of recent contributions to the literature on information acquisition with the
problem of optimal committee design when information is costly to acquire. Most papers in this
area assume that the committee members have common objectives and also that monetary transfers
are not used. As a result, it is probably easiest to see what additional insights costly information
acquisition brings into the model in this context.
For concreteness, we phrase our discussion of the model in terms of a jury problem. The
celebrated Condorcet Jury Theorem (see e.g. Black (1958)) states in its traditional form that
decision making in juries under majority rule outperforms decision making by any single individual
and as the number of participating voters increases the probability of the correct social decision
converges to one. The underlying idea is that in majority decisions, the information of several
jury members is aggregated and therefore such decisions are superior to those arrived at by any
individual jury member.
The jury chooses between two alternatives: y0 ∈ {0, 1} where 0 stands for acquitting and 1
stands for convicting the defendant. At the trial, there is uncertainty regarding the possible guilt
of the defendant. We model this by a binary state ω ∈ {0, 1} where 0 stands for innocence and 1
indicates guilt and for simplicity we assume that the prior probability satisfies: Pr{ω = 1} = 12 .
All jury members are assumed to have the same payoff functions u (y0, ω) satisfying:
u (0, 0) = u (1, 1) = 0, u (0, 1) = −d0, and u (1, 0) = −d1.
In other words, convicting guilty and acquiring innocent defendants is costless. The costs of wrong-
ful conviction is d1 > 0 and the cost of wrongful acquittal is d0 > 0.
At the trial, jury members are presented with evidence on the guilt of the defendant. This
is modeled through signal si observed by juror i. We assume that the signals are binary, i.e.
si ∈ {0, 1} and correlated with truth in the sense that Pr{si = 0 |ω = 0} = p > 12 and Pr{si =
1 |ω = 1} = q > 12 . Furthermore, we assume that signals are independent across jurors conditional
on the state ω. Decisions in the jury are reached by majority voting. The vote of juror i is denoted
by vi : Si → [0, 1], where vi(si) is understood to be the probability of voting to convict after
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observing signal si. The jury decision is given by:
y0 : {0, 1}I → [0, 1],
where y0 (v) gives the probability of convicting given vote profile v.
The logic behind the Condorcet Jury Theorem runs as follows. If the jury members vote based
on their private signal, then the vote counts provide a better signal of ω than the individual si.
The problem with this argument is, as pointed out by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), that in
general it is not in the interest of an individual juror to vote in accordance with their private signal.
When the voting stage is seen as a Bayesian game, sincere voting, i.e. vi (0) = 0, vi (1) = 1 for all
i is not a Bayesian equilibrium of the game. The reason for this is that at the moment of casting
their votes, each jury member must condition her beliefs about the innocence of the defendant on
the event that her own vote is pivotal. In a majority rule vote, this implies that the other jury
members’ votes are equally split. If p > q, equal split together with sincere voting implies that
ω = 1 is much more likely than ω = 0 and as a result, the individual juror has an incentive to
discard her own information. Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) compare the expected equilibrium
payoff from different voting rules ranging from simple majority to unanimity as a function of the
cost parameters d0 and d1. By concentrating on symmetric equilibria where the individual jurors’
strategies are responsive to private signals, they show that a wide range of rules can be optimal.
To see how costly information acquisition changes the situation, Persico (2004) considers a
simple modification to the jury problem above. The signal of each jury member is observed only
with cost c > 0. This cost is assumed to be private and as a result, a discrepancy between social
and private incentives for acquiring information arises.2 While Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998)
obtain the result that the expected payoff from jury decisions increases in the number of members
on the jury, Persico (2004) concludes that optimal jury size is bounded even if the private costs
of information acquisition are not accounted for in the social welfare calculation. The reason for
the difference in the results depends on the fact that information acquisition by the jurors brings
in an element of moral hazard into the decision making process. In order for the jurors to be
willing to pay for information, their probability of being pivotal must remain non-negligible. This
is only possible in juries of bounded size. Perhaps more interestingly, Persico (2004) finds that the
optimal voting rule is independent of d0 and d1 and instead depends on the statistical nature of
evidence, i.e. on p and q. For the special case where p = q, he shows that for small c, the optimal
supermajority in the jury decisions converges to p.
2In the literature on jury decisions, the role of monetary transfers has been ignored. This seems to be a reasonable
approximation to most committee decision making processes that are observed in the real world. In addition, Persico
(2004) shows that with monetary transfers the problem of inducing efficient information acquisition can be trivially
solved.
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A second remarkable property of jury design under costly information acquisition is that the
voting rule is efficient given the information acquired by the jury members. In the setting of
Persico (2004), this property arises partially from the fact that the analysis focuses on pure strategy
equilibria. Under this restriction, any suboptimal decision rule would imply that some agents do
not acquire information. Mukhopadhaya (2003) concentrates on the symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium and shows that for a fixed voting rule, increasing the jury size may decrease the accuracy
of decisions when information acquisition is costly.
Gershkov and Szentes (2004) consider the optimal method of inducing information acquisition
and eliciting it truthfully from homogenous committee members subject to the requirement that the
decisions must be ex post efficient. In other words, they require that given the information collected
in the committee, the decision must agree with the optimal one. They show that the optimal method
of gathering information is to approach the committee members sequentially but withholding the
previous record of both who has been approached and what information has been transmitted. It
is also interesting to note that their optimal mechanism features randomized decisions on whether
to collect additional information.
In a similar problem, Smorodinsky and Tennenholtz (2005) show that a sequential mechanism
is also optimal in a class of mechanisms that arrive at the correct social decision with probability
1. In this paper, there is no trade-off between costs of information acquisition and the accuracy of
the decision.
Gerardi and Yariv (2005) remove the restriction on ex post efficiency of the mechanism. They
show that the optimal decision rule is not generally of the type considered in Persico (2004), but
rather that it may involve randomizations and ex post inefficient decisions.
The issue of signal accuracy is addressed in Li (2001). In that paper, all jury members invest
in information that is useful for determining the guilt of the defendant. In contrast to the other
papers surveyed here, Li assumes that the signals are publicly observable. As a result his model is
very close to traditional free-riding models of informational externalities. He shows that in order to
provide good incentives for information acquisition, it may be optimal to distort the rule mapping
signals to decisions. Martinelli (2006) considers a voting model in which the citizens have identical
preferences but have a continuous choice regarding the precision of their private information. As
the number of participating citizens increases, each individual agent decreases the precision of her
private information, but with c′ (0) = c′′ (0) = 0 at zero precision, in the limit the simple majority
rule leads to the election of the best candidate with probability one.
Finally, Cai (2003) considers the optimal size of a committee under a fixed decision rule in a
committee when the members have heterogenous payoff functions. If individual committee members
have preferences different from those of the designer of the committee, they have an incentive to
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distort their reports to the designer. The main observation of the paper is that preference diversity
may increase the individual members’ incentives for acquiring information. As a result, the optimal
size of committees may be higher under preference diversity as the free rider problems are alleviated.
To summarize, the papers reviewed in this section demonstrate in a simple setting how mecha-
nism design problems must be modified in order to take into account the costs of getting informed.
When jury members have the same objectives, but bear the cost of information acquisition privately,
free riding becomes an issue in models where information acquisition decisions are not observable.
If it is possible to commit to decision rules at the start of the game, free riding can be fought
to some extent by an appropriate choice of the decision rule. Sometimes this may involve taking
decisions that are suboptimal in light of the collected information. Even when restricted to ex post
optimal decision rules, the design of an appropriate extensive form for eliciting information from
the jury members provides insights into the general problem.
4.2 Information in Principal-Agent Models
Throughout this paper, we assume that information acquisition is covert, in other words, the
principal does not see whether the agent has acquired additional information or not. It is easy to
see in the single agent setting that information acquisition adds an element of moral hazard on
top of the original adverse selection model. Consider for instance the model where a principal sells
an indivisible object to an initially uninformed agent. At cost c, the agent can learn privately her
valuation for the object. It is clear that timing plays a crucial role in the analysis of this model.
If the principal offers contracts after information acquisition, the model reduces to an adverse
selection model conditional on the equilibrium level of information acquisition. If the contract is
offered prior to information acquisition, we are in the traditional moral hazard world where the
principal extracts all surplus from the agent. Finally, if contract offers and information acquisition
decisions are simultaneous, information acquisition decisions are often in mixed strategies and the
principal tries to screen the informed buyers from the uninformed.
The role of information acquisition in a principal-agent setting has been investigated in a series
of papers by Cremer and Khalil (1992), Cremer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a) and Cremer, Khalil,
and Rochet (1998b). In Cremer and Khalil (1992), the basic problem is a standard adverse selection
problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown cost as in Baron and Myerson (1982). The new
element is that the agent does not know her type at the moment the contract is offered. She can
learn her type, say her marginal cost, either before or after signing the contract. A cost c must
be paid to acquire information prior to signing the contract, whereas after signing the contract the
type is revealed at zero cost. Information acquisition is therefore socially inefficient. The private
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benefit for the agent, however, is that she may be able to reject contract offers which would not
be profitable given her marginal cost. Cremer and Khalil (1992) show that the ability of the agent
to acquire information decreases the downward distortion at the production stage. The optimal
contract raises the expected value of the contract, type by type, so that the agent will have no
incentive to acquire the information in equilibrium.
The distinction between costly pre-contract and free post contract information is also central
in a recent study by Matthews and Persico (2005) on the excess refund puzzle. They consider the
optimal price and refund policy of sellers when the potential buyers can either engage in costly
research to assess the value of the object or wait until delivery and inspection of the object. As
the return of the object is costly, the optimal selling policy has to find a balance between returns
and sales. Similar to Cremer and Khalil (1992), they show that it might be optimal for the seller
to offer a refund policy sufficiently generous so as to prevent the buyer in equilibrium to acquire
information. The distortion in the refund policy relative to the socially optimal policy leads to an
excess in refunds.
In Cremer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998a), the setting is modified by assuming that all information
about the cost structure has to be acquired at some fixed cost c. Again, the impact of information
acquisition affects both the production schedule and the rent to the agent. For a sufficiently small c,
the optimal contract is the standard Baron-Myerson contract. As the cost of information acquisition
increases, the value of the contract decreases for the principal. The optimal contract reduces the
distortion for low cost types, and increases it for high cost types. This is the most efficient way to
increase the rent for the agent so that she has an incentive to acquire the information. At higher
c, it is optimal to leave a rent to the uninformed agent. As the principal cannot receive the entire
surplus, the production level is below the ex-ante efficient level. As information is costly, it may
not be optimal to acquire information even from a social point of view. An open issue is then
whether the design of the contract by the principal will lead the agent to take a socially efficient
decision regarding information acquisition or whether it will introduce a systematic distortion in
the decision of the agent.
Finally, in Cremer, Khalil, and Rochet (1998b), the decision by the agent to get informed is
taken covertly before the contract is offered. This reversal in the timing of the decision introduces
strategic uncertainty for the principal as the agent may randomize over information acquisition. The
resulting equilibrium is one in which the principal offers a menu of contracts, one of which is chosen
by the informed and the other is chosen by the uninformed agent. The two contracts display partial
pooling, in a sense that for low marginal cost of production, informed and uninformed will produce
the same quantity. For intermediate and high production cost, the informed agent will see more
downward distortions, and relative to standard Baron-Myerson type contracts, the production will
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be higher respective lower for medium and high cost types. The change in the production schedule
is enacted so as to efficiently generate surplus for the informed agent and give him incentives to
acquire information.3
4.3 Information Acquisition in Auctions
Within the field of mechanism design, auction theory has seen the largest number of contributions
in the last decade. Surprisingly few of those papers have focused explicitly on costly information
acquisition. This is somewhat puzzling given the close connections between auctions and price
formation processes in competitive markets. Milgrom (1981) explores the issue of information
acquisition in a model similar to the one presented in the motivating example. His main concern
is on determining whether the model can be used in providing foundations for the fully revealing
rational expectations equilibrium. The connections to the rational expectations equilibrium have
been since worked on extensively but the issue of information acquisition has received considerably
less attention. In our view, the questions relating to socially optimal information acquisition remain
open for a large class of auctions models.4
Early contributions to the literature compared the revenue generation across different auction
formats, most notably between first and second price auctions. Matthews (1977) and Matthews
(1984) obtained the result that the two formats lead to the same expected revenue in a special case
of an affiliated model. This result is also later found in a sequence of papers on the independent
private information case. These include Hausch and Li (1991), Tan (1992) and Stegeman (1996).
The most direct way of seeing why private values settings lead to same revenue rankings for different
auction formats is to observe that by the revenue equivalence theorem, they are equivalent to the
Vickrey auction. Hence the ex ante incentives for investing in information (or even to make more
general investments) must be the same. Rogerson (1992) makes this point in a more general
mechanism design setting than the current auctions model.
If the auction designer has a utilitarian welfare objective, it is again easy to see that the agents
have the correct incentives to acquire information in a socially optimal manner. In the Vickrey
auction, individual payoffs, when viewed as functions of own payoff type only, coincide with the
sum of payoffs to all players (up to the addition of a constant). As a result, individual incentives
3A literature on delegated expertise that started with Demski and Sappington (1987) considers information acqui-
sition in the moral hazard model. A recent contribution by Malcolmson (2004) reflects the state of this literature.
Starting with Aghion and Tirole (1997), this model has been investigated the role of information acquisition in the
optimal design of organizations from an incomplete contract point of view.
4A notable exception is Jackson (2003) who shows that in auction setting with a large number of bidders and
costly information acquisition information aggregation may fail and not lead to the efficient allocation.
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coincide with those of the planner.
Information acquisition in auctions has also been modelled as an auction with costly entry.
Johnson (1979), French and McCormick (1984), McAfee and McMillan (1987), Levin and Smith
(1994) formulate entry as a model in which potential bidders do not possess private information
until they incur an entry cost. Upon incurring the cost, they acquire a private signal about the
value of the object.
In a more general model of affiliated values, Persico (2000) shows that the incentives for infor-
mation acquisition are in general different across different auction formats. In particular, he shows
that the marginal incentives for acquiring additional information are higher for first price auctions
than for second price auctions. This may overturn the general superiority of second price auctions
as demonstrated in Milgrom and Weber (1982). In a model with affiliated values, additional in-
formation allows more accurate predictions of other players’ bids. As the transfers in a first price
auction depend on own bids, it is important to obtain such information in order to be able to shade
own bids optimally.
In Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002), we consider the possibility of maintaining the utilitarian
optimal allocation in a model of interdependent but statistically independent valuations. Each
bidder i acquires information on ωi and this information is independent across the bidders. As
explained above, we can view the information acquisition decision as a choice of distributions over
the posterior beliefs θi on Ωi. Bidder i has an expected payoff
ui (θ) = ui (θ1, ..., θI) =
∫
Ω
u˜i (ω1, ..., ωI) dθ1 (ω1)...dθI(ωI) ,
where we recall that dθi (ωi) is the conditional distribution over ωi given the realization of signal
or posterior θi.The utilitarian planner would like to allocate the object to bidder i such that
ui (θ) ≥ uj (θ) for all j ∈ {1, ..., I}.
As explained in the motivating example, this can be done using the generalized VCG mechanism
when the utility functions satisfy the single crossing property:
∂ui (θ)
∂θi
≥ ∂uj (θ)
∂θi
for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., I}.
We assume that ωi and si satisfy monotone likelihood ratio property for all αi. Furthermore we
assume that the experiments are indexed in such a manner that α > α′ implies that experiment α
is better in the sense of Lehman’s order of effectiveness than α′. For this ordering, it makes sense to
assume that c(α) is strictly increasing in α. Our main finding in Bergemann and Va¨lima¨ki (2002)
is that if u˜j (ωi, ω−i) is decreasing in ωi for all j 6= i, then the VCG auction gives too low incentives
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for information acquisition to the individual bidders. If u˜j (ωi, ω−i) is increasing in ωi for all j 6= i,
then the individual agents have an incentive to engage in excessive information acquisition.
It should be pointed out that this result does not guarantee that all the equilibria of the infor-
mation acquisition game between the individual bidders feature excessive information acquisition
in the case where u˜i (ω) is increasing in ωj . It is simply a local comparison of individual and social
incentives for information acquisition. As such, it shows that the utilitarian optimum is not achiev-
able, but it does not tell us definitively whether equilibrium information acquisition is excessive
or not. In any case, it is clear that the best mechanisms must trade off losses at the information
acquisition stage and losses at the allocation stage. In Bergemann, Shi, and Va¨lima¨ki (2005), we
verify that in a model with binary information acquisition decisions equilibria of the information
acquisition game feature excessive information acquisition when u˜i (ω) is increasing in ωj .
4.4 Dynamic Auctions
Section 4.3 dealt with static mechanisms where the information acquisition decision is taken prior
to executing the mechanism. In dynamic auctions such as the ascending price auction, information
about the valuations of the opponents is disclosed as the mechanism is run. As a result, the timing
of information acquisition becomes a key consideration for the bidders in such auctions. One of the
main insights of the papers reviewed in this section is that the dynamic auction formats may make
it easier to arrive at socially optimal decisions and they may also generate higher revenues to the
seller than their static counterparts.
Compte and Jehiel (2000) compare the performance of a second price sealed bid auction and an
ascending price auction in the presence of information acquisition. They consider a private value
environment in which all but one agent are privately informed about the value, but the final bidder
has to pay a cost to acquire and assess her valuation for the object. The ascending auction then
provides the uninformed bidder with an option to acquire information should the chances of winning
as expressed by bidding and drop-out behavior of the competitor be reasonably good. They show
that the ascending price auction generates a higher expected welfare than the sealed bid auction.
If the number of bidders is sufficiently large, then the ascending price auction also increases the
expected revenue for the seller. Compte and Jehiel (2004) use the fact that the ascending price
auction offers the uninformed bidder an option value to show that if some additional information
is likely to arrive in the future, then the uninformed bidder will stay in the auction even when
the price has reached her expected valuation. Rezende (2005) offers a dynamic auction model in
which the private information of each bidder is characterized by her initial and unbiased estimate
of the value of the object and a private cost to learn the true value of the object. In an ascending
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price auction, each bidder observes the current price level (but not the drop-out behavior of the
competing bidders) and decides if and when to acquire the additional information. It is shown that
this sequential auction format is guaranteed to generate larger revenues relative to the sealed bid
auction provided the number of bidders is sufficiently large. A recent paper by Cremer, Spiegel,
and Zheng (2003) shows how the seller can extract the entire surplus from buyers when information
is costly to acquire.5
The cost of acquiring information motivates the analysis of indicative bidding in Ye (2005).
Commonly, the sale of assets or entire companies is conducted through a two-stage auction process.
In the first stage, a large group of bidders is invited to make indicative, but non-binding offers, and
in the second stage a subset of the first stage bidders is invited to make final bids for the object
of sale. Ye (2005) derives the optimal auction in the presence of information or due diligence costs
between the first and second stage bids.
4.5 Information Disclosure in Auctions
Up to this point our discussion of auctions has focused on the case where bidder i can obtain
an additional signal si on ωi. In the previous section, we allowed for the possibility of learning
about other bidders’ valuations during the auction. In some circumstances, it is natural to consider
also the case where other players may provide additional information to a bidder. In this section,
we concentrate on the case where the auctioneer has access to signals that she may reveal to the
bidders. Examples of such information disclosures include allowing the bidders to inspect the object
prior to the auction and providing an independent evaluation of the authenticity of a painting etc.
While the focus in the previous sections was on the case where information is costly to acquire,
a natural starting point for this section is the case where information is free. The reason for this
difference is that in contrast to the previous setting, it may now be in the best interest of the
auctioneer not to provide the bidders with full information even when there is no charge associated
with this information release. Once the form of optimal information release has been determined,
we can address the question of optimal information production by the auctioneer.
Since the discovery of the ‘linkage principle’ in Milgrom and Weber (1982), a lot of attention
has been devoted to the question of information disclosure by an informed auctioneer. As shown
by Milgrom and Weber in an affiliated values models, it is revenue enhancing for the auctioneer to
disclose information publicly to the participants in a wide range of auction formats.
In the last few years, the issue of information disclosure in auctions has received a lot of
5A complementary literature in theoretical computer science investigates mechanism design when it is costly to
elicit the preference profile, see e.g. Parkes (2004). This literature emphasizes the role of proxy bidding and the use
of indirect mechanisms.
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attention. If the affiliated values model is asymmetric in the sense that the public information
affects the bidders’ valuations in a differential manner, Ganuza (2004) shows that linkage principle
may fail and it may be optimal for the auctioneer to reveal her private information partially.
Furthermore, Perry and Reny (1999) and Foucault and Lovo (2003) show that linkage principle does
not necessarily hold in auctions with multi-dimensional signals. With independent information,
Board (2005) shows that releasing information is in general revenue decreasing for second price
auctions when there are only two bidders.6
Starting with Mares and Harstad (2003), more general ways of communicating information to
the bidders have been considered. Mares and Harstad assume that the auctioneer can commit
to revealing the information to only one of the bidders. They give examples where this type of
proprietary disclosure of information dominates public disclosure in terms of generating higher
revenues. They also show that it may be particularly useful for the seller to release the proprietary
information to bidders that are initially disadvantaged.
Information disclosure has also been studied in models with private information. For such
models, the effects behind the original linkage principle are absent and the incentives for disclosing
information must have a different origin. Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001) study a model where
an auctioneer chooses the form of a signal si to show to each bidder i. More specifically, the
auctioneer chooses a general information structure Si of Ωi and bidder i observes signal si ∈
Si associated with a conditional probability p (ωi |si ) . The auctioneer does not know the signal
realization, but calculates its distribution from her prior distribution on Ωi. Once bidders have
their information, an optimal auction in the sense of Myerson (1981) is run. The main result of
the paper is that it is in general optimal for the auctioneer to provide each bidder with a coarse
partition, which reveals information only partially, and, if feasible assign asymmetric partitions.
This is easily seen in a two-bidder example example where ωi ∈ {1, 3} and the prior on Ω1 is
independent of the prior on Ω2 and Pr{ωi = 1} = 12 for i ∈ {1, 2}. By choosing S1 = {{1}, {3}}
and S2 = {{1, 3}} and running the auction where bidder i wins if s1 = {3} and pays 3 and bidder
2 wins if s1 = {1} and pays 2. The expected revenue from this auction is 52 which is more than the
optimal revenue of 2 when no information is release or 94 when all information is released.
In Eso and Szentes (2004), a different approach to information disclosure is adopted. Rather
than giving the information for free to the potential bidders, the auctioneer sells additional infor-
mation to possibly privately informed bidders. The starting point for this paper is that bidders
6Ivanov (2005) considers information disclosure in the model of strategic information transmission of Crawford
and Sobel (1982). As in Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001), the principal controls the information structure, but
only the agent can observe the realization of the signal. In consequence, the optimal information structure is again
coarse, yet improves the ex-ante welfare of the principal.
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may have some initial private information relating to their valuation for the object. In addition
to this, the auctioneer possesses information that determines the total valuation. To model this,
let vi be a random variable representing the private information of bidder i and let si denote the
signal controlled (but not observed) by the seller. The main result of the paper shows that when
si is independent of vi, the seller can obtain the same revenue as she could if si was observable to
her. The mechanism that allows for this is one where the bidders pay for the right to participate
in an auction whose payment and allocation rules are determined by the initial bids. Furthermore,
the paper shows that it is optimal to disclose si to bidder i (at a cost). For the case where vi
is degenerate, the result is reminiscent of the results on optimal entry fees to auctions. The key
difference to the model in Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2001) is that here the participation decision
of the bidders takes place prior to observing si and hence the individual rationality constraints for
the bidders differ across the two papers.
Cremer, Spiegel, and Zheng (2004) considers a sequentially optimal auction in which the seller
incurs a cost to disclose the information to each individual bidder. They show that the optimal
sequencing is similar to a symmetric information search problem after replacing true by virtual
utilities. Shavell (1994) combines the study of information acquisition and disclosure in a simple
auction setting. The study is motivated by a series of legal cases highlighting the tension between
information acquisition and disclosure (see Kronman (1978) for the legal analysis of this joint
problem). A seller owns a single good which she offers to competing buyers. The buyers value the
object identically but are uncertain about its true value. The seller can generate information about
the true value of the object, but her cost of doing is private information. The analysis distinguishes
between two cases: when information has no social and when it has social value. In the first case,
the object has the same value to all buyers who value it higher than the seller, whereas in the second
case, the optimal use for (or investment in) the object by the buyer will depend on its value. In
the case of pure common values, it is socially wasteful to generate information. Yet, with voluntary
disclosure, sellers with a low cost of producing information generate the information and disclose
the value if it is above a critical value v∗ and are silent if the true value is below v∗. The typical
unravelling result fails as sellers with a high cost do not produce information. In consequence,
the buyer interprets silence as resulting either from ignorance or from low quality. As ignorance
is a possibility, an informed seller may be able to extract a value higher than v, conditional on
v < v∗. This provides cover for the informed type and the incentive to generate information. On
the other hand, if information disclosure is mandatory, the seller follows the efficient policy and
always acquires information at the socially optimal rate, and therefore acquires no information in
the case of pure common values.
The issue of disclosure is of course also relevant in principal-agent models. Lewis and Sappington
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(1994) consider a optimal monopoly pricing model with incomplete information. The seller can
choose how much information, which improves their estimate about their taste for the products, to
disclose to the buyers. They show that typically the optimal release of information is either not to
release any information or to release the maximal amount of information. In Lewis and Sappington
(1994), the informative signal is private information to the buyer and not observable by the seller.
Johnson and Myatt (2006) model advertising as the disclosure of information and analyze the
optimal level of advertising in the context of an optimal monopoly pricing problem. Ottaviani
and Prat (2001) show in an affiliated value model of monopoly pricing and public disclosure of the
signal, that the principal is always better off by committing to disclose any affiliated signal publicly.
This result is an extension of the linkage principle from auction models to monopoly pricing models.
4.6 Information and Privacy
A more implicit source of information acquisition arises in repeated interactions with private in-
formation. Consider the relationship of a customer with one or more suppliers. If her willingness
to pay for the current transaction provides some information regarding her future purchases, then
the optimal selling policy today may be affected by considerations about the future value of the
relationship. A series of recent papers analyzes these issues, partly motivated by discussion about
the role of privacy in electronic retailing. Acquisti and Varian (2005) suggest a two period model
in which a single customer purchases repeatedly from a single seller and analyze the optimal pric-
ing policy of the seller. With forward looking buyers and perfectly correlated willingness to pay
across the two periods the optimal pricing policy is a sequence of static prices, reminiscent of the
analysis of the ratchet effect (see Freixas, Guesnerie, and Tirole (1985)). However, if the buyer
displays some myopia, then dynamic pricing, taking into account past purchase decision is optimal
even under full commitment. Taylor (2002) also considers a two period model but with different
suppliers in every period. The willingness to pay of the customer is positively, but not perfectly
correlated, and the initial supplier can sell the transaction information to future suppliers. The
paper considers two different regimes regarding the transmission of information, an anonymity and
a recognition regime. In line with the ratchet effect, it is shown that forward looking buyers prefer
the anonymity regime, but with some myopia, the customer recognition regime and the resulting
dynamic pricing may be preferred by customers and sellers. Calzolari and Pavan (2005) consider a
two period model, in which a single customer interacts sequentially with two different sellers. The
buyer’s willingness to pay for the two goods is perfectly correlated. The focus of the paper is on the
optimal disclosure policy of the firms, in particular whether the first firm should be allowed to sell
the transaction information to the second firm. Calzolari and Pavan (2005) show that if the goods
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are complements then the optimal disclosure policy is to provide full information. If the goods are
substitutes, then the optimal information policy is non-disclosure.
In an earlier paper, Rothkopf, Teisberg, and Kahn (1991) argued that the advantage of privacy
protection conferred by the English auction is one reason why the Vickrey auction is adopted less
frequently in practice than might have been expected from its multitude of theoretical advantages.
If the true valuation of the winning bidder is revealed in the bidding process, this may open the
door for opportunistic behavior by the seller or by third parties. If bidders have such a fear, it may
no longer be in their best interest to bid their valuation in the Vickrey auction. In the English
auction, only the valuation of the losing bidders can be inferred. As the winning bidders maintain
(at least partially) their private information, there is less reason to distort bidding behavior.
5 Robustness
In the first part of the survey, we emphasized the role of endogenous information for the design
and the performance of mechanisms. In the second part of the survey, we report when and how
mechanisms can achieve their objective even if the planner has little information about the agents’
beliefs about each other. As we have seen in the second motivating example, acquiring information
about other bidders naturally gives rise to type spaces where the players own payoffs do not give
a sufficient description of the strategic environment, but where one must account for higher order
beliefs as well. The main task here is to identify which properties of the mechanism guarantee that
the mechanism is robust to strategic uncertainty and hence large type spaces.
The discussion of robustness is an old theme in the mechanism design literature. Hurwicz
(1972) discussed the need for “nonparametric” mechanisms (independent of parameters of the
model). Wilson (1985) states that a desirable property of a trading rule is that it “does not rely on
features of the agents’ common knowledge, such as their probability assessments.” Dasgupta and
Maskin (2000) “seek auction rules that are independent of the details - such as functional forms
or distribution of signals - of any particular application and that work well in a broad range of
circumstances”.
5.1 Wilson Doctrine
“Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences of trad-
ing rules that presumably are really common knowledge; it is deficient to the extent
it assumes other features to be common knowledge, such as one player’s probability
assessment about another’s preferences or information.
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I foresee the progress of game theory as depending on successive reductions in the base
of common knowledge required to conduct useful analyses of practical problems. Only
by repeated weakening of common knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate
reality.” Robert Wilson (1987)
Our starting point is the influential formulation of robustness due to Robert Wilson. Wil-
son emphasized that academic mechanism designers were tempted to assume too much common
knowledge information among the players, and suggested that more robust conclusions would arise
as researchers were able to relax those common knowledge assumptions. He suggested that the
problem is that we make too many implicit common knowledge assumptions in our description of
the planner’s problem. A possible modelling strategy therefore is to first make explicit the implicit
common knowledge assumptions, and then weaken them. The approach to modelling incomplete
information introduced by Harsanyi (1967-68) and formalized by Mertens and Zamir (1985) is ide-
ally suited to this task. Harsanyi argued that by allowing an agent’s type to include her beliefs
about the strategic environment, her beliefs about other agents’ beliefs, and so on, any environ-
ment of incomplete information could be captured by a type space. With this sufficiently large
type space, the universal type space, it is true that there is common knowledge among the agents
of each agent’s set of possible types and each type’s beliefs over the types of other agents.
However, as a practical matter, applied economic analysis tends to assume much smaller type
spaces than the universal type space, and yet maintains the assumption that there is common
knowledge among the agents of each agent’s type space and each type’s beliefs over the types of
other agents. An important early paper by Neeman (2004) showed how rich type spaces can be used
to relax implicit common knowledge assumptions in a mechanism design context. In particular, he
considered a model of surplus extraction as Cremer and McLean (1985) and showed how rich types
space may lead to a failure of the surplus extraction result. Heifetz and Neeman (2006) strengthen
this insight and show that generic priors do not permit full surplus extraction. We shall shortly see
further instances in which the small type space assumption imposes very substantive restrictions.
5.2 Robust Mechanism Design
In order to accommodate a planner who knows little about the agents’ beliefs about other agents’
types, a recent literature has looked at mechanisms that implement the social choice correspondence
in ex post equilibrium. Bergemann and Morris (2005c) consider a situation where each player has
one of a set of possible payoff types and the social planner seeks to implement a social choice
objective mapping payoff type profiles to sets of acceptable outcomes. They are interested in
partial implementation - i.e., whether truthtelling in the direct mechanism is consistent with the
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social choice correspondence? The usual approach to this question would be to assume a commonly
known common prior on the payoff types. Partial implementability is then equivalent to Bayesian
incentive compatibility in the direct mechanism. Bergemann and Morris (2005c) ask instead when
it is possible to implement the social choice correspondence in equilibrium, whatever the players’
beliefs and higher order beliefs about other players’ types.
Holding fixed the payoff environment, one can construct many type spaces where an agent’s
type specifies both her payoff type and her belief about other agents’ types, as we illustrated in the
introductory example. Crucially, there may be many types of an agent with the same payoff type.
Intuitively, the larger the type space, the harder it is to implement the social choice objective,
as there are more incentive constraints to be satisfied, and so the more “robust” the resulting
mechanism is. The smallest type space is the payoff type space where the possible types of each
agent are equal to the set of payoff types and a common knowledge prior over this type space is
assumed. This is the canonical type space in the mechanism design literature. The largest type
space is the union of all possible type spaces that could have arisen from the payoff environment.
This is in many circumstances equivalent to working with a universal type space in the sense of
Mertens and Zamir (1985).7 There are many type spaces in between the payoff type space and the
universal type space that are also of interest. While maintaining that the above payoff environment
is common knowledge, one would like to allow the agents to have all possible beliefs and higher
order beliefs about their types. A flexible framework for modelling such beliefs and higher order
beliefs are “type spaces”. A type space is a collection
T =
(
Ti, θ̂i, pii
)I
i=1
.
Agent i’s type is ti ∈ Ti. The type of agent i must include a description of her payoff type. Thus
there is a function
θ̂i : Ti → ∆(Θi) ,
with θ̂i (ti) being the probability distribution of agent i’s payoff type when her type is ti. In
particular, agent i might be uncertain about her own payoff type. A type of agent i must also
include a description of her beliefs about the types of the other agents. Write ∆ (Z) for the space
of probability measures on the Borel field of a measurable space Z. The belief of type ti of agent i
7Yet, Bergemann and Morris (2001) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b) emphasize that type spaces may allow
for more correlation than is captured in the belief hierarchies of types as in Mertens and Zamir (1985). More precisely,
identifying types that have identical hierarchies may lead to a loss of information. Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris
(2005) and Ely and Peski (2006) propose interim rationalizability as a solution concept under which all type spaces
that have the same hierarchies of beliefs also have the same interim rationalizable outcomes.
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is a function
pii : Ti → ∆(T−i) ,
with pii [ti] being agent i’s beliefs when her type is ti. Thus pii (E) [ti] is the probability that type
ti of agent i assigns to other agents’ types, t−i, being an element of a measurable set E ⊆ T−i.
A type space T is a payoff type space if each Ti = Θi and each θ̂i is the identity map. Type
space T is finite if each Ti is finite. Finite type space T has full support if pii (ti) [t−i] > 0 for all
i and t. Finite type space T satisfies the common prior assumption (with prior p) if there exists
p ∈ ∆(T ) such that ∑
t−i∈T−i
p (ti, t−i) > 0 for all i and ti
and
pii (t−i) [ti] =
p (ti, t−i)∑
t′−i∈T−i
p
(
ti, t′−i
) .
Definition 3 A direct mechanism f : T → Y is interim incentive compatible on type space T if∫
t−i∈T−i
ui
(
f (ti, t−i) , θ̂ (ti, t−i)
)
dpii (ti) ≥
∫
t−i∈T−i
ui
(
f
(
t′i, t−i
)
, θ̂ (ti, t−i)
)
dpii (ti)
for all i, t ∈ T and t′i ∈ Ti.
The notion of interim incentive compatibility is often referred to as Bayesian incentive compat-
ibility. We use the former terminology as there need not be a common prior on the type space.
It should be emphasized that a direct mechanism f can prescribe varying allocations for a given
payoff profile θ as different types, t and t′, may have an identical payoff profile θ = θ̂ (t) = θ̂ (t′).
By inspection of the ex post incentive constraints in Definition 1, ex post incentive compatibility
is sufficient for interim incentive compatibility, but is it necessary?
Bergemann and Morris (2005c) show that interim incentive compatibility on all common prior
payoff type spaces is equivalent to ex post incentive compatibility in separable environments. An
environment is called separable if the outcome space has a common component and a private value
component for each agent. Each agent cares only about the common component and her own
private component. The social choice correspondence picks a unique element from the common
component and has a product structure over all components. In separable environments, interim
implementation on all common prior payoff type spaces implies ex post implementation. Whenever
the social choice correspondence is a function, the environment has a separable representation since
the private value components can be made degenerate. A second leading example of a separable
environment is the problem of choosing an allocation when arbitrary transfers are allowed and
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agents have quasi-linear utility. If the allocation choice is a function but the planner does not care
about the level and distribution of transfers, then the environment is separable.
This result provides a strong foundation for using ex post equilibrium as a solution concept
in separable environments. Since ex post implementation implies interim implementation on all
type spaces (with or without the common prior or the payoff type restrictions), it also shows
the equivalence between ex post implementation and interim implementation on all type spaces.
To the extent that the mechanisms required for ex post implementation are simpler than the
mechanisms required for Bayesian implementation, these results contribute to the literature on
detail free implementation and the ”Wilson doctrine”.
For separable environments, the restriction to payoff type spaces is not important. But interest-
ingly, outside of separable environments, the restriction matters. Bergemann and Morris (2005c)
report a simple example of a two agent quasi-linear environment where the balanced budget require-
ment holds: transfers must add up to zero. In this example, ex post implementation and interim
implementation on all type spaces are both impossible, but interim implementation on all common
prior payoff type spaces is possible. The quasi-linear environments with budget balance is a lead-
ing example of an economic non-separable environment. With two agents, there is an equivalence
between ex post implementation and interim implementation on all type spaces. With at most two
payoff types for each agent, there is the stronger equivalence between ex post implementation and
interim implementation on all payoff type spaces. But with three or more agents with three or
more types, equivalence between ex post implementation and interim implementation on all type
spaces breaks down.
For other approaches to formalizing robust mechanism design, see Chung and Ely (2003),
Duggan and Roberts (1997), Eliaz (2002), Hagerty and Rogerson (1987), and Lopomo (1998),
(2000) and Auriol and Gary-Bobo (2005).
Chung and Ely (2004) consider the optimal auction with private values in large type spaces.
They show that a dominant strategy mechanism may achieve a higher payoff than any Bayesian
equilibrium mechanism provided that the type space is large. The intuition is that for any given
mechanism, there may exist a type space which exposes weaknesses in the incentive constraints
and leads to an inferior expected revenue result in comparison to a dominant strategy mechanism
in which the agent are only asked to report their payoff type, but not to report any belief type.
5.3 Robust Implementation
The revelation principle only establishes that the direct mechanism has an equilibrium that achieves
the social choice function. In general, there may be other equilibria that deliver undesirable out-
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comes. In the spirit of the “Wilson doctrine”, it is then natural to look for implementation results
that are robust to different assumptions about what players do or do not know about other agents’
types. While the possibility of multiple equilibria seems relevant for practical mechanism design
problems the theoretical literature has not resulted in many practical insights (with a few recent
exceptions such as Ausubel and Milgrom (2005) and Yokoo, Sakurai, and Matsubara (2004)).
In light of the earlier results on robust incentive compatibility, it is natural to ask whether
implementation in Bayesian equilibrium for all possible higher order beliefs is equivalent to ex post
implementation in the payoff type space. Bergemann and Morris (2005a) investigate the conditions
required for ex post implementation i.e. they ask whether it is the case that all ex post equilibria
deliver outcomes in the social choice correspondence. The task for the designer, who does not
know the agents’ types, is to choose a mechanism such that in every equilibrium of the mechanism,
agents’ play of the game results in the outcome specified by the social choice objective at every
type profile.
The complete information implementation literature (see Maskin (1999)) makes the assumption
of common knowledge of preferences, the Bayesian implementation literature (see Postlewaite and
Schmeidler (1986), Palfrey and Srivastava (1989), and Jackson (1991)) makes the assumption that
there is common knowledge of a prior on a fixed set of types. This assumption is unlikely to be valid
for practical market designers and it imposes a substantive constraint when viewed as a restriction
on all possible beliefs and higher order beliefs. Bergemann and Morris (2005b) show that robust
implementation is a more stringent requirement than ex post implementation. While the incentive
compatibility constraints for this problem are the same as for the ex post implementation problem,8
the resulting ”robust monotonicity” condition (equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type
spaces) is strictly stronger than ex post monotonicity (and Maskin monotonicity). The resulting
robust monotonicity notions provide full implementation counterparts to the robust mechanism
design (i.e. partial implementation) questions discussed earlier. In particular, they show that
interim implementation on all type spaces is possible if and only if it is possible to implement the
social choice function using an iterative deletion procedure. The observation about iterative deletion
illustrates a general point well-known from the literature on epistemic foundations of game theory
(e.g., Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003b)): equilibrium solution
concepts only have bite if we make strong assumptions about type spaces, i.e., we assume small
type spaces where the common prior assumption holds.
By exploiting the equivalence between robust and iterative implementation, Bergemann and
Morris (2005b) obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for robust implementation in general en-
8This follows from results in Bergemann and Morris (2005c).
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vironments. The necessity argument is conceptually novel, exploiting the iterative characterization.
The necessary conditions for robust implementation are ex post incentive compatibility of the so-
cial choice function and a condition - robust monotonicity - that is equivalent to requiring interim
monotonicity on every type space. The robust monotonicity condition is very strong and implies
both Maskin monotonicity and ex post monotonicity conditions (but is strictly weaker than domi-
nant strategies). As an added benefit, the robust implementation analysis removes the frequent gap
between pure and mixed strategy implementation in the literature. The iterative characterization
comes with the additional benefit that tight implementation results can be proved via a fixed point
of a contraction mapping.
An important paper of Chung and Ely (2001) analyzes the single (and multi-unit) auction with
interdependent valuations with dominance solvability (elimination of weakly rather than strictly
dominated actions). In a linear and symmetric setting, they reported sufficient conditions for
direct implementation that coincide with the ones derived in Bergemann and Morris (2005b). In
the environment with linear aggregation, under strict incentive compatibility, the basic insight
extends from the single unit auction model to general allocations models, with elimination of
strictly dominated actions only (thus Chung and Ely (2001) require deletion of weakly dominated
strategies only because incentive constraints are weak). By comparing the conditions for ex post
and robust implementation, it becomes apparent that robust implementation typically imposes
additional constraints on the allocation problem.
5.4 Local Robustness
The approach of robustness in the above literature requires that a mechanism could be implemented
for all possible types spaces. This robustness criterion is therefore clearly very demanding and it is
plausible to investigate weaker local robustness criteria. In addition, the approach above requires
that the allocation problem can be defined independent of the beliefs of the designer and the
agents. Yet there are cases such as revenue maximizing mechanism, (e.g. optimal pricing and
optimal auction), that depend on the beliefs of the designer.
Bergemann and Schlag (2005) investigate a robust version of the classic problem of optimal
monopoly pricing with incomplete information. The robust version of the problem is distinct in
two aspects. First, instead of a given true distribution of valuations, the seller only knows that
the true distribution is in a neighborhood of a given model distribution. The enlargement of the
set of possible priors represents model misspecification. Second, the objective function of the seller
is formulated as a regret minimization rather than a revenue maximization problem. The regret
is the difference between the actual valuation of the buyer for the object and the actual revenue
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obtained by the seller. The regret of the seller can be positive for two reasons: (i) the buyer has a
low valuation relative to the price and hence does not purchase the object, or (ii) she has a high
valuation relative to the price and hence the seller could have obtained a higher revenue. For a given
neighborhood of possible distributions, they then characterize the pricing policy which minimizes
maximal regret. They describe how the robust policies depend on the model distribution and the
size of the risk as represented by the size of the neighborhood.
Segal (2003) also considers optimal pricing with unknown demand. In his model, the seller does
not know the distribution from which the buyers’ valuations are drawn. However, she knows that
the valuation of each buyer represents an independent draw from the same distribution. He then
suggest an optimal pricing mechanism in which the seller offers individualized prices. The price
of individual i however only depends on the information she received from all customers but i.
By making the price independent of the report of agent i, the equilibrium strategy of each bidder
is an ex post equilibrium strategy. Similarly, Baliga and Vohra (2003) consider trading models
when buyers and sellers do not know the distribution of valuations. They consider dynamic and
adaptive mechanism with and without intermediaries. They show that as the number of traders
becomes large, the adaptive mechanism achieves the same expected revenue as if the seller were
to know the true distribution of the demand. Goldberg, Hartline, and Wright (2001) consider a
similar problem but in contrast do not even make the i.i.d. assumption about the valuations of the
customers. Without any Bayesian information, they derive the optimal selling mechanism under
the competitive ratio. In other words, they maximize the worst case revenue relative to the optimal
revenue which could be obtained if the seller were to know the true valuations of the buyers. The
worst case analysis and the notion of competitiveness is central in many optimal design problems
analyzed in computer science (see the recent survey to online design problems by Borodin and El-
Yaniv (1998)). In auction theory, Neeman (2003) analyzes the competitiveness of the second price
auction. A recent article by Prasad (2003) presents negative result, and in particular shows that the
standard optimal pricing policy of the monopolist is not robust to small model misspecifications.
5.5 Rationalizability and Robustness
An alternative approach of allowing richer beliefs and strategic uncertainty into standard mechanism
design is to relax the solution concept from equilibrium to rationalizability, an approach pursued
by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003a) and Dekel and Wolinsky (2003). Battigalli and Siniscalchi
(2003a) consider the standard private value auction with a continuum of valuations and bids.
They show that any positive bid up to some level above the Nash equilibrium is rationalizable.
In contrast, Dekel and Wolinsky (2003) consider a set-up with a finite number of valuations and
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bids, but allow for some degree of affiliation. They show that as the number of bidders increases,
the set of rationalizable bids converges to the bid closest to the true valuation. Similarly Cho
(2005) considers the first price auction in a model with affiliated values, and analyzes rationalizable
strategies after imposing the additional restriction that all feasible bidding strategies have to be
monotone. He shows that the winning bid in the set of rationalizable bidding strategies converges
to the competitive equilibrium price as the number of bidder increases. Cho (2004) extends the
rationalizability analysis to large uniform and double price auctions.
5.6 Strategic Uncertainty in Auction Theory
We finally discuss how rich type spaces and strategic uncertainty modify and change central results
in auction theory. Fang and Morris (2005) illustrate the role of large type spaces for the revenue
equivalence theorem. They analyze a model of independent private values with two bidders. How-
ever each bidder receives a two-dimensional signal, the first element is her private valuation (the
valuation type) and the second element is a noisy signal about the valuation of her competitor (the
information type). The addition of the second signal enriches the strategic information of each
bidder but obviously reduces common knowledge among bidders and auctioneer. The model is thus
a natural generalization of the discrete type framework offered in the motivating example. In this
simple setting, they compare first and second price auctions and conclude that the revenue equiva-
lence theorem fails and that no definite revenue ranking exists with multidimensional signals, even
though the setting remains a private value model. Naturally, the additional strategic information
does not change the bidding strategy in the second price auction, but affects the bidding strategy
in the first price auction. The additional information can have two distinct effects on the bidding
strategy. Suppose that bidder 1 receives a signal that bidder 2 is likely to have a similar valuation.
Relative to her bidding strategy without the strategic information, she now has essentially two
choices. She can either increase her bid to improve her chances of winning, or she can lower her
bid, and focus on winning against lower valuation types of her opponent. The optimal response to
the strategic information will depend on the informativeness of the signal and may go either way.
In consequence, bidding may become more fierce or more subdued, leaving the revenue ranking
open to go in either direction. The multi-dimensional private value model is closely related to the
affiliated value model of Wilson (1977) and Milgrom and Weber (1982). Yet, in Fang and Morris
(2005), the belief of bidder 1 about bidder 2 depends directly on the value type of bidder 2 rather
than the value type of bidder 1 as in the affiliated value model.
Kim and Che (2004) analyze the role of strategic information in a similar setting. In an inde-
pendent private value setting with I bidders, a subset of bidders observe the valuation of each agent
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in its subset but no additional information about the agents in the complementary set. They also
find that the revenue equivalence theorem fails and establish that a second price auction generates
a higher expected value than the first price auction. Andreoni, Che, and Kim (2005) pursue an ex-
perimental study of this set-up and largely confirm the theoretical predictions. Ye (2004) considers
an auction with entry. Each bidder has to incur a cost before learning her own valuation. Yet, in
contrast to earlier work, each bidder will also receive some noisy information about the value of the
competing bidders. If the information potentially available to the bidders after entry is sufficiently
rich, then he shows that the Vickrey auction is the only optimal sealed bid auction. Finally a recent
paper by Feinberg and Skrypacz (2005) pursues the logic of multidimensional types, in particular
the separation between payoff types and belief types in the context of bargaining under incomplete
information.
6 Conclusion
In this survey we emphasized the role of information for mechanism design. First, we discussed
an emerging literature on the role of endogenous information for the design and the efficiency of
the relevant mechanism. Second, we argued that in the presence of endogenous information, the
robustness of the mechanism of the type space becomes a natural desideratum. We then discussed
some recent approaches to robust mechanism design and implementation.
During our discussion of the recent contributions, we have indicated that many questions remain
wide open, and in fact the current research poses and creates many new questions. We end this
survey by collecting a few of them.
As we consider the role of information acquisition, it is natural to consider dynamic and in
particular mechanisms in which information is acquired sequentially. Recent work by Compte
and Jehiel (2000) showed that the ascending price auction improves upon the static second price
auction by allowing for contingent information acquisition. Yet in the ascending price auction
information arrives in a particular way. The estimated expected value of the competing bidder is
increasing over time. It is then natural to ask whether a descending price auction might sometimes
be more favorable for information acquisition than an ascending price auction. The advantage
of a descending price auction is that bidders receive over time information that their bids are
more likely to be competitive, otherwise the clock would have been stopped by a competitor.
Interestingly, Klemperer (2002) suggests a sequential combination of English and Dutch auction
to enhance entry and deter collusion. A combination of English and Dutch auction could also
be optimal to generate information and hence competition among the bidders. As many bidding
processes are inherently dynamical in nature, we believe that there are further theoretical as well as
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practical reasons to investigate information acquisition in dynamic settings. Bidding in a takeover
contest and negotiating the terms for a business proposal are obvious examples. The dynamic
nature of bidding process here reflects the actual fact finding about the proposed outcomes and in
addition determines the strategic positions based on the information currently at hand.
We saw that the ex post efficient mechanisms may lead to excessive information acquisition in
typical auction settings. We can then ask how the ex post efficient mechanism should be modified
to achieve a second best solution. There are two natural modification. The slope of the probability
that an agent gets the object could be reduced until information acquisition in equilibrium coincides
with the social equilibrium. With a completely randomized decision to allocate the object, the agent
will not have any incentives to acquire information. Thus if we change the probability from efficient
to completely inefficient we eventually correct the incentives to acquire information. For the given
interim probability distribution, we can then identify the allocation which leads to the lowest loss
in terms of efficiency.
In the area of robustness, much of the recent work focused on testing the robustness of a social
choice function or mechanism which can be identified independent of the beliefs of the agents
and the designer, the problem of finding an efficient allocation is a classical example. In many
relevant design problems, the beliefs of the designer and the agents enter into the determination
of the mechanism, the leading example here is seller maximizing revenue from an optimal auction.
Formulating the robust mechanism design problem for this class of problems becomes conceptually
more difficult. In order to maximize revenue, the designer must be endowed with some beliefs over
the agents’ types. To formalize a notion of robustness, one ought to consider a set of possible
beliefs.
Bergemann and Morris (2005d) suggest one possible way to proceed by maintaining the as-
sumption that the principal is certain about the true distribution over payoff types, but allow the
principal to be uncertain about agents’ beliefs and higher order beliefs about other agents’ types.
For a given prior distribution over payoff types, they try to find (i) the optimal mechanism for a
given type space, and (ii) the worst case type space which minimizes the revenue of the designer.
Even though the distribution over payoff types is kept constant at a given prior, the strategic un-
certainty severely limits the designer to extract the surplus. They show that in many instances,
the revenue of the auctioneer can be reduced to the level which could be obtained in the ex post
equilibrium of the game.
We discussed in some detail the role of large type spaces for implementation. If the agents
possess large amounts of private information relative to the designer, then their ability to coordinate
actions ought to increase and hence the equilibrium multiplicity problem may become severe. If
the agents succeed in coordinating their actions on equilibrium play which is undesirable from the
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principal’s point of view, then the issue of multiplicity is essential an issue of collusion among
the agents. It is thus conceivable that a common framework and characterization techniques to
understand robustness, equilibrium multiplicity and collusion in the context of mechanism design
might emerge as one result of this research on large type spaces.
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